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Frege believed that any difference in the cognitive significance of two 
sentences must reflect an objective semantic difference. This view has 
in one form or another represented the received view in the philosophy 
of language since the appearance of 'On Sense and Meaning'. 1 But this, 
I want to argue, is a mistake --  a mistake that has seriously retarded our 
understanding of the relation between thought and language. Although 
various linguistic phenomena, if carefully examined, would help expose 
the error  in this view, ! shall here concentrate on the evidence provided 
by the phenomenon of indexical reference. 
Frege's puzzle about the potential informativeness of true identity 
statements is really an instance of what, for him, was a more general 
puzzle: How is it that two sentences can differ in cognitive significance 
when both sentences require, in order to be true, that precisely the 
same object or objects fall under precisely the same concept or 
relation? According to Frege, two sentences will differ in cognitive 
significance (express different Gedanken) just in case it is possible for a 
competent and reasonable speaker to believe what is expressed by the 
utterance of one while, without changing his mind, falling to believe 
(either disbelieving or suspending judgement on) what is expressed by 
the utterance of the other. 2 For  Frege, the possibility that two sentences 
with the same referential content can nevertheless differ in c~gnitive 
significance indicated that there must yet be an objective semantic 
difference between those two sentences. How could there be a genu- 
inely epistemically relevant difference that did not reflect a genuine 
truth value relevant difference? So if two sentences differ in their 
cognitive or epistemic significance, it must be because the two sen- 
tences, in virtue of graspable differences in their objective truth value 
relevant features, relate the speaker in different ways to the state of the 
world that must obtain in order  for them to be true. 3 
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The notion of sense was introduced to account for this difference. 
The puzzling differences in cognitive significance between two sen- 
tences are explained by the fact that structurally correlative, co-ref- 
erential expressions in the two sentences have different senses. They 
make different contributions to the cognitive significance of the sen- 
tences containing them. The sense of a singular term, for example, will 
be the objective, cognitively relevant mode of presentation of the 
referent associated with and expressed by that term. Since two co- 
referential singular terms may present their referent to a speaker in 
cognitively distinct ways, counterpart sentences containing these two 
terms may differ in their cognitive significance. 
Frege's puzzle is easily adapted to sentences containing indexical 
expressions. It should be obvious, for example, that one could demon- 
stratively refer to the same individual on two different occasions, or 
under two different circumstances, and in such a way that it would be 
informative to be told that the object referred to on these two occasions 
was one and the same. So phenomena parallel to that which motivated 
Frege's theory of sense occur in cases involving indexicals. Indexical 
expressions, however, and the sentences containing them prove to be 
notoriously difficult to accommodate within anything like a traditionally 
conceived theory of sense and reference. 4 Nevertheless, recent philoso- 
phers continue to take seriously the need to provide a systematic 
semantic account of indexical reference capable of accounting for the 
cognitive significance of indexicals. 
Of these philosophers, perhaps none has had more influence than 
David Kaplan. 5 His theory, which is designed to handle both "pure 
indexicals" such as 'I', 'here', 'now', etc. and "true demonstratives" such 
as 'this', 'that,' 'these', etc., is aimed at providing a unified account of 
both the conditions which determine an object as the referent of an 
indexical on a particular occasion of use, and also the different 
cognitive significance of distinct uses of a given indexical to refer to the 
same object. Although he is critical of Frege's original theory for its 
inability to accommodate certain important aspects of the semantic 
behavior of indexicals, Kaplan's proposals reflect his acceptance of the 
Fregean view that differences in cognitive significance must mirror 
objective semantic differences. 
In what follows, I examine certain aspects of Kaplan's theory, 
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focusing on his attempt to provide a semantic account of the reference 
of indexicals that is capable, at the same time, of accounting for their 
cognitive significance. I shall concentrate on Kaplan's treatment of 
demonstratives, for it is with respect to these that he explicily commits 
himself to solving Frege's puzzle. My discussion, however, will inevit- 
ably have consequences for Kaplan's treatment of "pure" indexicals as 
well. In particular, I hope to expose the sort of distortion that commit- 
ment to Frege's direct connection thesis engenders in the case of 
demonstratives - -  how it leads to a failure to appreciate fully either 
the distinctive cognitive or the distinctive semantic features of these 
indexicals. 
I. KAPLAN'S "CORRECTED FREGEAN THEORY 
OF DEMONSTRATIVES". 
1. Indexicals are, for Kaplan, referring expressions the meaning of 
which provides a rule that determines the referent in terms of certain 
aspects of the context in which it is used. 6 He first distinguishes 
between "pure" indexicals and "true" demonstratives. An indexical is 
"pure", in Kaplan's sense, when the context-invariable rule provided by 
its meaning fully determines the referent for each context of use. No 
supplementary actions, intentions, beliefs or perceptions are either 
needed or relevant to determining the referent. Competence with 
"pure" indexicals consists in the speaker's grasping this rule. The 
linguistic rule governing the use of 'I', for example, stipulates roughly 
that the referent of a literal and competent use of 'I' in a given context 
will be the speaker himself. Thus any competent speaker will refer to 
himself when he correctly uses 'I', and nothing about the way he or his 
surroundings appear to him in that context, no pointing to another or 
believing he is another or intending to refer to someone who is in fact 
another, will be able to defeat or in any way affect that reference. 
Likewise with 'here' and 'now'. The rules governing their use specify 
roughly that their referents in a given context of use will be, respec- 
tively, the place and time of that use; and again, nothing about how 
things appear to the speaker in that context, no pointing, no beliefs, etc., 
will be in the least relevant to determining their reference. In this way, 
then, the linguistic rule governing the use of a pure indexical is 
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complete and not in need of any supplementation by an associated 
demonstration. 
It is not, however, plausible to hold that the context-invariable rule 
governing the use of a "true" demonstrative is likewise capable of 
autonomously determining the referent of that demonstrative for each 
context of use. The use of a demonstrative is incomplete without an 
associated demonstration, "typically, though not invariably, a (visual) 
presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing" [p. 9]. The 
demonstrative refers in a given context to that which the demonstration 
picks out in that context. Reference determination is a function of the 
context4nvariable rule and the demonstration. 
Perhaps the central claim in Kaplan's theory is that all indexicals are 
what he calls "directly referential". A directly referential term may 
denote different objects when used in different contexts; but when 
evaluating the truth value of what was said in a given context (the 
truth-evaluable propositional content) only the object denoted in the 
context of use will be relevant. Thus, if a is directly referential, and if in 
a given context of use a refers to a, then in evaluating the truth value of 
the proposition expressed by an utterance of r~ban in that context, with 
respect to a counterfactual situation, it will only be relevant whether or 
not, in that counterfactual situation, a (the object originally denoted) 
possesses the property expressed by ~b. This will be the case even if the 
counterfactual situation were such that had a been used in that 
situation it would have referred to some different object. 
The content of a sentence in a given context will be the truth-evalu- 
able proposition determined in that context. It is what gets evaluated in 
circumstances of evaluation, either actual or counterfactual. The con- 
tent of an expression is its contribution to the truth-evaluable proposi- 
tional content of the sentence containing it. In the case of directly 
referring expressions, the content is intuitively the object denoted in a 
context of use. Formally, though, Kaplan represents the content of a 
directly referring expression as a constant function from possible 
worlds (circumstances of evaluation) to extensions. Indeed, in general, 
the content of any expression is formally represented as what would 
traditionally be called its intension. For most of our purposes, however, 
nothing will be lost if we simply talk as if the contextually determined 
designatum of a directly referring expression is itself the content. 
Kaplan himself often talks this way. 
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The character of a sentence is a function which determines its 
content in varying contexts. The character of a directly referring 
expression, then, will be a function that determines the referent of that 
expression for a given context. In the case of pure indexicals, the 
character is the context-invariable meaning rule which determines the 
referent for each context of use. Since the context-invariable meaning 
rule associated with demonstratives is not sufficient to determine a 
referent until supplemented with a demonstration, that rule by itself 
would seem to be incapable of serving as a complete character. 
Although Kaplan is not always clear on this matter, it seems to be his 
view that a demonstrat ive assumes a complete character only when 
supplemented by a particular demonstration. 
Kaplan calls his overall theory of demonstratives the 'Corrected 
Fregean Theory of Demonstrat ives '  [p. 57]. In it he hopes to incorpo- 
rate what he takes to be the insights of a Fregean theory of demon-  
stratives while at the same time avoiding some of its more  obvious 
difficulties. In particular, he endorses what he takes to be a Fregean 
theory of demonstrations, demonstrations being, according to Kaplan, 
that feature of an act of demonstrat ive reference which, given the 
context in which the act was performed,  determines both the demon-  
stratum as well as the cognitive significance of the utterance involved. 
The "correction" of Frege's theory involves incorporating the fact that 
demonstratives are directly referring expressions. But, it should be 
emphasized, Kaplan accepts as essentially correct the manner  in which 
the Fregean theory of demonstrations (as he understands it) accounts 
for how a given demonstrat ion determines its demonstratum, and at the 
same time how in virtue of this it determines the contribution of that 
demonstrat ion to the cognitive significance of the utterance of which it 
is a part. As Kaplan puts it: 
The Fregean theory of demonstrations claims, correctly I believe, that the analogy 
between descriptions and demonstrations is close enough to provide a sense and 
denotation analysis of the 'meaning' of a demonstration. The denotation is the demon- 
stratum and it seems quite natural to regard each demonstration as presenting its 
demonstratum in a particular manner which we may regard as the sense of the 
demonstration. [p. 36] 
Now, while I am basically sympathetic with Kaplan's assessment of 
the problems he finds with the original Fregean theory of demon-  
stratives, I believe that ultimately the kind of overall picture of 
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demonstrative reference that underlies his endorsement of the Fregean 
theory of demonstrations is misguided. It is misguided because it 
presupposes a kind of direct connection between semantics and 
cognitive significance that does not exist. By attempting both to account 
for how reference is secured by a given act of demonstrative reference 
and to account thereby for the differences in cognitive significance of 
different acts of demonstrative reference, the Fregean theory of 
demonstrations, even given its new "corrected" role, fails adequately to 
do either. 
2. Kaplan suggests that for Frege the paradigm of a meaningful 
referring expression is the definite description which picks out or 
denotes an individual in virtue of that individual's satisfying some 
condition C which the description (overtly) expresses. 7 The condition 
by means of which the description picks out its reference is the mode of 
presentation of the referent for that description. It is the speaker's grasp 
or awareness of this condition that underlies its cognitive significance 
for him. And it is the fact that different descriptions can present the 
same individual to us, though in different ways -- that is, in virtue of 
that objects satisfying different conditions -- that we are able to solve 
Frege's problem about the informativeness of true identity statements 
involving distinct (descriptive) referring expressions. In other words, 
according to Kaplan, it is the fact that certain definite descriptions 
which in fact are satisfied by the same individual, might nevertheless 
have been (or might reasonably seem capable of being) 8 satisfied by 
different individuals, that explains the possible informativeness of true 
identity statements involving distinct definite descriptions [cf. p. 52]. 
As Kaplan understands it, the Fregean theory of demonstrations is 
based on the exploitation of a (purported) analogy between descrip- 
tions and demonstrations. If we stress the analogy between the means 
by which a definite description presents its denotation and the means 
by which a demonstration presents its referent, we should be able to 
provide something like a sense and reference analysis of the "meaning" 
of a demonstration parallel to that of a definite description. According 
to this view, then, something like a sense is essentially associated with 
each demonstration, something that determines both the reference of 
the demonstration as well as its cognitive significance in a given context. 
CONTENT, CHARACTER, COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 167 
This analogy constitutes the basis of the Fregean theory of demon- 
strations. And, to repeat, Kaplan accepts it. 
As I noted at the outset, an important aim of the Fregean theory of 
demonstratives is to enable us to account for the informativeness of 
true demonstrative identity statements, or, more generally, to explain 
the differences in cognitive significance between two identical demon- 
strative claims about the same object. If the theory can be developed in 
the way just outlined, it would provide just such an account, an account 
paralleling that available in the case of definite descriptions --  i.e., in 
terms of distinct senses that are hypothesized to be associated with each 
of the distinct demonstrations such that, though they in fact pick out the 
same demonstratum, could have picked out distinct demonstrata. Since 
the conditions associated with each of the two demonstrations could 
have been (or might reasonably seem capable of being) satisfied by 
distinct objects, the identity claim made using these two demonstrations 
will be informative. 
Insofar as the above theory seems coherent, it appears to solve our 
adaptation to demonstratives of Frege's puzzle. Unfortunately, as 
Kaplan points out, it does so at the cost of misrepresenting at least one 
important aspect of the semantics of demonstrative sentences. The 
trouble, according to Kaplan, is that the Fregean theory takes the 
analogy between descriptions and demonstrations just a bit too far. 
Definite descriptions, as normally used, are not directly referential But 
Kaplan convincingly argues that demonstratives are directly referential 
[pp. 34--36]. The only object relevant to the truth or falsity of what is 
said on the occasion of uttering a demonstrative sentence is the object 
actually demonstrated; and this is true no matter what possible circum- 
stances with respect to which one might be concerned to evaluate what 
was actually said. So here, at least, we have a significant disanalogy 
between ordinary definite descriptions and demonstrations. 
Suppose, however, that it were possible for a speaker to use a 
description in such a way as only to fix the reference, in Kripke's 
favored sense of that phrase, 9 without the conditions expressed by the 
description entering into the content of what was said. If this were 
possible, the descriptive conditions could serve both to secure the 
referent on an occasion of use and account for the cognitive signifi- 
cance of the description on that occasion, while the description, so 
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used, would be directly referential. Well, is there anything to prevent 
us from using a description in precisely this way? We could - -  and, in 
fact, Kaplan does - -  easily introduce an operator  into the language - -  
Kaplan's  expression is "dthat" [p. 46] 10 _ such that whenever we want 
to use a description merely to fix the referent, we would prefix the 
description with our new operator.  Thus, for example, if I said, 
(1) Dthat(the inventor of bifocals) died at the age of 83, 
and if someone wanted to determine if what I said would be true in 
some other possible world, he would have to determine whether in that 
world Benjamin Franklin died at the age of 83. It would be irrelevant 
to the evaluation whether in that world Benjamin Franklin (or, for that 
matter, anyone else) invented bifocals. 
But now, as Kaplan would quickly point out, something very much 
like this seems to occur when we refer demonstratively. Whatever  
conditions an object must satisfy in order  to count as the object being 
demonstrated on a particular occasion, those conditions, and thereby 
the demonstration, serve only to fix the referent. They are not included 
in the content of any sentence containing the relevant demonstrat ive 
that is uttered on that occasion. 
The parallel is obvious. Indeed, Kaplan is so struck by the parallel 
that he concludes that for all theoretical purposes demonstrations may 
be assimilated to (dthat-prefaced) descriptions. He  writes: 
Since no immediate relevant structural difference has appeared between demonstrations 
and descriptions, I regard the treatment of the 'dthat' operator in the formal logic L.D. 
as accounting for the general case. [p. 56] 11 
Kaplan even (playfully?) envisions the possibility of adding to the 
syntax of his particular formal treatment non-logical demonstrat ion 
constants which would play a syntactic and semantic role analogous to 
that of an ordinary descriptor. But is the nature and extent of the 
parallel in fact sufficient to justify Kaplan's  conclusion? Are  there really 
no "relevant" differences between demonstrations and descriptions? 
In showing that demonstratives are directly referential, what Kaplan 
has shown is that those features - -  whatever they may be -- of the 
actual demonstra tum that make it the reference of a demonstrative on 
a given occasion of use are never part  of the truth-evaluable content 
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of the uttered sentence. But notice: nothing essentially involved in 
recognizing this necessitates the adoption of any particular account of 
demonstrative reference --  let alone a (modified) Fregean one. It is 
important to see that Kaplan is not required to endorse the further 
assimilation between 'dthat'-descriptions and demonstrations. In fact, 
all that Kaplan can legitimately claim is that what he calls the "direct- 
ness" of demonstrative reference does not preclude it from being 
explained descriptionally. Impressed, however, by his 'discovery' that 
direct reference to an object can be secured descriptionally, Kaplan 
proceeds to suggest that the direct reference of demonstrations is 
secured in some s!gnificantly similar way. 
II. SENSE, CHARACTER, AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE. 
1. While the structural parallel between Kaplan's merely reference- 
fixing descriptions and demonstrations is indeed striking --  i.e., demon- 
strations do seem only to fix the reference of their associated demon- 
stratives - -  nothing in this suggests that the parallel extends beyond 
this in such a way that the kind of conditions by means of which an 
act of demonstrative reference fixes its referent should be thought of 
as operating in the same way as the (essentially attributive) kind of 
conditions by means of which a description fixes its referent. In the case 
of Kaplan's 'dthat'-descriptions, the relevant descriptors could, but do 
not contribute their satisfaction conditions to the propositional content 
of the sentences in which they occur. It is a serious question, however, 
whether in the case of demonstrations it is even sensible to suppose that 
the sort of conditions that are genuinely operative in fixing the referent 
could plausibly contribute to the propositional content which gets 
expressed on the relevant occasion of utterance. Only someone ante- 
cedently predisposed to the view that uniquely describing something is 
the paradigmatic or fundamental means by which we manage to refer 
would assume the parallel to extent in this way. 
But what could possibly predispose one to this view? Well, the 
behavior of descriptions seems to fit in extremely well with the view 
that differences in cognitive significance must directly reflect objective 
semantic differences; ~2 for it will seem obvious (at least to anyone 
influenced by Russell - -  as Kaplan plainly is) that the differences 
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in cognitive significance between different descriptions are a direct 
function of differences in the satisfaction conditions of the relevant 
descriptors. This being the case, the view that uniquely describing 
something is the fundamental means by which we manage to refer wilt 
seem very attractive, if not inevitable. The assimilation of demonstra- 
tions and descriptions is not far behind. 
Even though Kaplan's semantical point about the directness of 
demonstrative reference can be made without committing oneself to 
any account of how reference gets fixed by means of acts of demonstra- 
tive reference, Kaplan nevertheless feels compelled to endorse the 
Fregean assimilation of demonstrations and descriptions. Why? Evi- 
dently because without it he sees no other way -- consonant with his 
endorsment of Frege's view that differences in cognitive significance 
must directly reflect semantic differences -- of handling Frege's puzzle 
as it applies to sentences containing demonstratives. After all, unless as 
a matter of established linguistic fact there will be associated with each 
demonstration on the occasion of its performance a set of cognitively 
accessible conditions, satisfaction of which by an object is necessary and 
sufficient if that object is to count as the demonstratum, how is the 
potential informativeness of true demonstrative identity statements to 
be explained? How else are we to explain the possibility of a speaker's 
rationally holding conflicting epistemic attitudes towards the contents 
expressed by distinct utterances of the same demonstrative sentence- 
type, when in each case the same thing is being predicated of the same 
object? 
Kaplan's version of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the potential 
informativeness of identity statements involving descriptions plainly 
depends upon a certain (traditional) view of the nature and role of 
sense in determining the cognitive significance of a definite description 
for a particular speaker. It depends upon viewing the speaker's under- 
standing of a given definite description as consisting in his knowing just 
those conditions which must be satisfied by an object if that object is 
to count as that description's referent. On this view, there will be a 
difference in cognitive significance just in case there is a difference in 
the satisfaction conditions conventionally associated with and expressed 
by each of the descriptions. These conditions and they alone are 
relevant to the (semantic) determination of the description's reference. 
CONTENT, CHARACTER, COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 171 
Consequently, the cognitive significance of the description is exhausted 
by an awareness of these conditions [cf. p. 43]. A competent speaker's 
intention to refer with a definite description will, consequently, be 
viewed as an intention to refer to whatever satisfies the conditions 
knowledge of which by him constitutes his understanding of and com- 
petence with the given description. If the parallel, as Kaplan wants to 
draw it, is to hold, then something similar must be the case for 
demonstrations. 
Demonstrations, then, like descriptions, must have associated with 
them a sense or mode of presentation which specifies a cognitively 
accessible set of reference-fixing conditions such that it might have 
been the case that they be (or might reasonably seem capable of being) 
satisfied by different objects than they in fact are. Competence, then, 
with respect to the use of demonstrations will have to consist, at least in 
part, in the speaker's ability to discern (and express) these relevant 
conditions on given occasions of demonstrative use. He will count as 
demonstratively referring to that object on that occasion in virtue of 
his cognitive access to the conditions associated with a particular 
demonstration, and his intending to refer to whatever in the context 
satisfies them. 
According to Kaplan's theory, then, the linguistic rules governing the 
competent use of demonstratives will require that some such sense- 
constituting set of conditions be associated with any given demonstra- 
tion. Obviously, however, unlike the case with definite descriptions, 
these demonstrative conditions will not be antecedently determined by 
conventionally fixed, context-invariant semantic properties of the ex- 
pressions making up some descriptor. Rather, they will have to be 
determined in some systematic or rule-governed way on the spot, as it 
were. 
Plainly, before we can begin to evaluate whether or not this way of 
looking at things provides an adequate explanation of demonstrative 
reference, we need to be told something more specific about the nature 
of these demonstrative senses. How exactly are we to conceive of the 
conditions imposed by the sense of a demonstration? How are we to 
understand, in Kaplan's terminology, the (complete) character of a 
demonstrative on a given occasion of use? 
Kaplan provides us with the following answer. He suggests that the 
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"standard form", as he puts it, for the sense of a demonstration type will 
be given by something like, 
(Dk) The individual that has appearance A from here now. [p. 53] 
Presumably, then, the "standard form" of the complete character of a 
demonstrative on a given occasion of use will be given by something 
like, 
(DCk) Dthat (The individual that has appearance A from here 
now). 
Kaplan goes on to explain that by "appearance" he means "something 
like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject." 
Whatever questions of detail one might raise about how exactly one is 
to understand (Dk) , it seems fair to allow that if, following Kaplan, one 
accepts that demonstrations have senses analogous to those of descrip- 
tions, then these senses, these demonstrative modes of presentation, will 
have to be something very much like what (Dk) represents them to be 
--  at least in the case of perceptually presented demonstrations. 
Now perhaps the first thing to strike one as potentially 'problematic 
about (Dk) is the appearance therein of the pure indexicals, 'here' and 
'now'. Unless some account is offered of their contribution to the 
cognitive significance of demonstrations, (Dk) can count at best as only 
partially characterizing the sense or character associated with com- 
petently used occurrences of 'that'. For  example, if their use in turn 
required the recognition of demonstrative senses - -  as would be the 
case if it were correct to analyze 'here' and 'how' respectively as 'this 
place' and 'this time' --  then plainly (Dk) would not only be incomplete, 
but would be inherently inadequate, either begging the question or 
leading to a regress of demonstrative senses. 
For  Kaplan, however, this particular problem should not arise; for 
'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals. As such, their reference is 
supposed to be fully determined by their context-invariable character; 
no associated demonstration is required or relevant. And, moreover,  
competence with pure indexicals will involve grasping this fact. A 
speaker need only have mastered the character of a pure indexical in 
order  to be able successfully to refer with it in a given context. Nothing 
else that he believes, or knows, or intends will be in the least relevant to 
determing the referent.13 
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But now how are we to understand the cognitive significance of one 
of these pure indexicals on a given occasion of use? How are we to 
understand their contribution, as represented in (Dk), to the cognitive 
significance of a particular demonstation? 
Kaplan's position seems to be that the cognitive significance of a 
referring expression is exhausted by what the speaker knows that is 
relevant to determining its reference (content) in a given context. This 
being the case, then, according to Kaplan's own principles, everything 
except its character should be irrelevant to the contribution made by 
a pure indexical to the cognitive significance of those statements, 
including demonstrative statements, made with their help. This follows 
directly from Kaplan's 'Epistemological Principle 2', which simply 
states: "Cognitive significance of a Thought = Character" [p. 60], and 
from his own principle of compositionality for characters: 
(F1) The character of the whole is a function of the character of 
the parts. That is, if two compound well-formed expressions 
differ only with respect to components which have the same 
character, then the character of the compounds is the same. 
[p. 26] 
Thus, since (DCk) represents for Kaplan the standard form of the 
complete character of a demonstrative in use, 'here' and 'now' will 
contribute just their characters to the character of any particular 
demonstrative in use. So, the presence of 'here' and 'now' in (Dk) 
contribute nothing contextually variable to the cognitive significance of 
a demonstration. 14 
Their presence then, it would seem, serves only to fix the context in 
which the condition, having the appearance A, is to apply. Conse- 
quently, it will have to be having the appearance A, that constitutes the 
distinctively variable cognitively significant part of any demonstration. 
So, if in a given context a demonstration D is mounted by which it is 
required that the demonstratum have appearance A, and if in another 
context a demonstration D' is mounted by which it is required that the 
demonstratum have appearance A' ,  then D and D' should be tokens of 
the same demonstration type just in case A = A'.  
2. As an attempt to characterize the cognitive significance of demon- 
strations, Kaplan's proposal will not do. One obvious problem with (Dg) 
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can be traced directly to Kaplan's  relying on the character of pure 
indexicals to capture their cognitive significance. Plainly, different uses 
of the same pure  indexical may differ in cognitive significance for a 
person despite the sameness of character on the two occasions. 
Suppose, for example, that I am strapped to a chair in a controlled 
environment and a speaker in the room points to a particular object in 
the room and says to me. 
(2) That is an F. 
I believe him. During this time, I correctly believe myself to be  in Ann 
Arbor .  
Immediately after the demonstration, I am rendered unconscious. 
For  whatever reasons - -  it doesn' t  really matter  what they are so long 
as they are not unreasonable - -  I believe, when I wake up, that a great 
deal of time has passed, that I am no longer in Ann Arbor ,  and that I 
have been moved to Baltimore. I find myself, however, seated in the 
same place in a room exactly like the one I was in before. Beside me is 
the same man who was in the previous room. And before me is an 
object that looks exactly like the one I was shown in Ann Arbor .  I think 
to myself: Ah, they're trying to fool me into thinking that we're still in 
Ann Arbor!  In fact, we still a r e  in Ann Arbor;  and everything, 
including the object is exactly as it was before, and only seconds have 
passed. As soon as I regain consciousness, the man points at the object 
in exactly the same way as before and says, 
(3) That  is an F. 
But for one reason or another, I do not believe that the object 
demonstrated in Ann Arbor  was moved to Baltimore. This being the 
case, I do not believe what the man says. I believed what he said when 
he uttered (2), but, without changing my mind about that, I do not 
believe what he said when he uttered (3). Thus, (2) and (3) differ for 
me in cognitive significance. 
Notice that in both cases the same object was presented to me in 
exactly the same manner.  Not  only is the demonstra tum (as well as 
what was predicated of it) the same in both cases, but the qualitative 
way in which the demonstrated object appears  to me in both cases is 
exactly the same. According to Kaplan's  principles, then, my com- 
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panion will have performed two tokens of the same demonstration type. 
But from all of this it should follow not only that the truth-evaluable 
propositional content of the two utterances is the same, but that the 
cognitive significance of the two utterances is the same. 
But as the example makes plain, this is not the case. If the demon- 
stration accompanying the utterance of (2) and the demonStration 
accompanying the utterance of (3) were of equivalent cognitive signifi- 
cance for me, then it would be irrational for me to think that the two 
demonstrations referred to different objects. But plainly, there is 
nothing irrational in rrly doing so. 15 
It is a simple fact that any two demonstrations mounted by the same 
speaker (no matter how qualitatively similar their manner of presenting 
their demonstrata) will have been mounted at different times and might 
have been mounted from different places. Given the physical possi- 
bilities opened up by a lapse of time or, possibly, a change of place, 
this fact by itself suffices to ground the possibility of different objects 
being demonstrated by distinct demonstrations. And recognition by a 
speaker/auditor of these possibilities in turn suffices to ground the 
possibility that any two qualitatively similar demonstrations may differ 
in cognitive significance. Moreover, recognition of these possibilities is 
guaranteed by, indeed, partially constitutive of a speaker's special 
competence will demonstratives. No appeal to demonstrative sense or 
appearance is required to explain the potential differences in cognitive 
significance of acts of demonstrative reference. 16 Whether or not 
someone believes that two qualitatively similar demonstations pick out 
the same object will importantly depend upon what the speaker 
believes about the time and place of the demonstrations and the 
reasonableness for him, given these and his other beliefs, of the 
demonstrata being different. 
So far, the problem here lies with the inadequacy of any identifica- 
tion of the character of pure indexicals with their cognitive significance, 
or, more generally, with the inadequacy of Kaplan's Epistemological 
Principle 2. Plainly, "Here = P", uttered at P~ and "Here = P" uttered 
at P2, where PI # P2, will have exactly the same character but may 
differ in cognitive significance for me. So identity of character is 
insufficient for identity of cognitive significance. Even if the character 
and the content are the same, this will not guarantee identity of 
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cognitive significance. In the example above, suppose P1 ---- P2- Even so, 
it may be reasonable for me, given my extra-linguistic, collateral beliefs, 
not to believe that this is so. Consequently, the two utterances of 
"Here = P" will differ in cognitive significance for me. No attempt 
simply to index characters with their contents will yeild a satisfactory 
account (or formal representation) of the cognitive significance of these 
indexicals. 
Importantly, Kaplan's identification of character and cognitive sig- 
nificance fails not only for indexicals, but also for proper names and for 
predicates. In the case of names this is obvious. The character of a 
name (for Kaplan) will be a constant function from contexts to content. 
And, moreover, the content (intension) of a name will also be a 
constant function from circumstances of evaluation (possible worlds) to 
an object. But then plainly, different names with the same referent -- 
say, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" -- will have the same character, but 
may fail to have the same cognitive significance. 
A similar possibility opens up for predicates, although here the issue 
may be more controversial. Since the character of a (non-indexical) 
predicate is also a constant function from contexts to content (inten- 
sion), the problem will arise if there are two predicates that are, with 
respect to each possible world, coextensive, i.e., share the same inten- 
sion, and yet are not cognitive equivalents. The following, it seems to 
me, would be precisely such a case; other examples should be easy to 
construct. Suppose there were a dialect of English in which someone 
who has dysentary was called "dropsical". Moreover, suppose that most 
speakers of this dialect did not know the word "dysentary". Tyler, 
however, a speaker of this dialect, comes to learn about a disease called 
"dysentary", and, indeed, learns a lot about this disease. It is surely 
possible that Tyler fails to realize that having dysentary is the same as 
(in his home dialect) being dropsical. Suppose that all of Tyler's de 
dicto dysentary-beliefs are true. This is surely compatible with his 
believing a number of false de dicto dropsical-beliefs. Plainly, then, 
there would be claims that Tyler would assent to in which having 
dysentary was predicated of individuals, while dissenting from the 
counterpart claims involving being dropsical. So "having dysentary" and 
"being dropsical" clearly differ in cognitive significance for him, though 
semantically, they ought to be represented as having the same inten- 
sions and characters. 
CONTENT,  CHARACTER,  COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 177 
Kaplan is fight to insist that it is of the essence of a demonstration 
that it be mounted from some context or other, which is at least to say 
at some location and time, if it is to determine a referent, and that what 
referent is determined will importantly depend upon the context (the 
when and where) in which the demonstration is performed. Intent, 
however, on pressing the seductive analogy between demonstrations 
with descriptions, Kaplan seems to have failed adequately to appreciate 
the importance that certain of the speaker's or auditor's extra-linguistic, 
collateral beliefs will have on the cognitive significance that a demon- 
stration has for him --  especially those beliefs about the context in 
which the demonstration is mounted. Insofar as the context of a 
demonstration is relevant to what is demonstrated, the beliefs of a 
speaker/auditor concerning the relevant features of the context will 
inevitably affect the cognitive significance for him of a given demonstra- 
tion. That the cognitive significance of a demonstrative in use should be 
sensitive in this distinctive way to the speaker's collateral beliefs about 
the context of use seems an obvious and inevitable feature of how 
demonstratives work. 
Indeed, as our remarks about names and predicates above help 
suggest, it is generally the case that a speaker's extra-linguistic, col- 
lateral beliefs play an important and often ineliminable role in deter- 
mining the cognitive significance for him of his own and other people's 
utterances. The meaning of a speaker's words is not directly determined 
by, nor does it determine (except, relative to his other beliefs), the 
cognitive significance of those words for the speaker. Indeed, in more 
or less significant ways, the loss or acquisition of collateral beliefs may 
occassion changes in the cognitive significance of a word for a person 
without our having to suppose a correlative change in meaning. This is 
especially clear in the case of utterances containing pure indexieals, 
though the point is general. According to Kaplan's own theory, a 
speaker's extra-linguistic beliefs ought to be irrelevant to the speaker's 
ability to use pure indexicals to refer. This may or may not be so, but 
they are plainly not irrelevant to the particular cognitive significance 
that utterances containing these indexicals have. 
My point here is not that the notion of a character or some notion 
like it is irrelevant to semantics. On the contrary, I think that Kaplan 
has quite convincingly shown that some such notion (over and above 
extension and intension) is essential for any (model-theoretic) semantic 
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treatment of a language containing both modal expressions and directly 
referring expressions like indexicals and 'dthat'-descriptions. My point, 
rather, is that it is a mistake to think that there must always be some 
objective semantic correlate to the specific cognitive significance of an 
utterance. Character cannot play this role. In particular, whatever 
considerations go into determining the cognitive significance of a 
demonstration either for the speaker or his audience, it is a mistake --  a 
mistake that Kaplan makes --  to think that they are coextensive with 
what, for either the speaker or his audience, determines the referent of 
the demonstration. 
III. D E M O N S T R A T I V E  R E F E R E N C E  A N D  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  
1. So far I have criticized Kaplan's identification of the cognitive 
significance of a demonstrative in use with its character. I have done so 
primarily on the grounds that this identification fails utterly for pure 
indexicals, and that the character of demonstratives is supposed (by 
(DCK)) to be partially a function of the characters of the pure indexicals 
'here' and 'now'. Exposing this failure of (DCK) showed how Kaplan's 
attempt to force a direct connection between the cognitive significance 
of demonstratives and their semantics led to a wholly unsatisfactory 
account of the cognitive significance of demonstratives. But this is not 
the only failure of (DCK). Kaplan's endorsement of the Frege direct- 
connection thesis about the relationship between cognitive significance 
and semantics also leads to an unworkable account of how demonstra- 
tive reference is secured and an unacceptable view about the communi- 
cation and interpretation of demonstrative thoughts: 
Kaplan claims that the referent of a given demonstration will be 
determined as that which satisfies the appropriate, instance, in the 
appropriate context, of the schema (Dk): the individual that has appear- 
ance A f rom here now. But on at least one reading of (Dk) , this is 
plainly inadequate, for - -  to borrow a clich6 --  things are not always as 
they appear. This being the case, any proposal that the referent of a de- 
monstration mounted in a context C will be the object in C that 
'satisfies' or resembles the appearance will not do. 
But in suggesting that the demonstratum of a given demonstration 
will be the individual "that has appearance A"  in the context C in 
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which the demonstration was performed, Kaplan surely did not mean to 
suggest that the demonstratum will be whatever object in C is as the 
appearance A presents it to be. More likely, what Kaplan meant to 
suggest was that the demonstratum will be whatever object in C appears 
as A presents it, whether or not it in fact is as it appears to be. In effect, 
the suggestion here would be that the relevant appearance is, in some 
way, to be mentioned and perhaps characterized in the reference fixing 
description, but not used as we had previously supposed. On this 
interpretation of (Dk), the demonstratum will be the actual object in C, 
if any, that in fact is appearing A-like to the relevant speaker/auditor. 
But this interpretation of (Dk) is plagued with its own serious 
problems. Consider the condition of being whatever object, if any, is 
appearing A-like to the relevant speaker/anditor. Recall that an appear- 
ance, as Kaplan would have us understand this notion, is "something 
like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject." 
Needless to say, in referring demonstratively, I do not intend to be 
referring to everything that is perceptually presented to me at the time 
of the demonstration. Rather, there is some particular object (out of 
indeterminately many objects presented) that I intend to refer to. This, I 
take it, is what Kaplan's talk of a "little arrow pointing to the relevant 
subject" is intended to take care of. But how exactly is this appeal to 
arrows supposed to work? Either the "arrow" is pointing to part of the 
picture, or the arrow is pointing (from part of the picture?!) to the 
object itself. 
Take the first case. Is Kaplan's talk of the arrow pointing to part of 
the picture merely to suggest that some particular item in the scene 
which appears is somehow more salient than the others? 17 But some- 
thing can be a salient feature of my experience in a whole variety of 
ways: it can be the most colorful, the loudest, the most frightening, the 
most attractive, the one on which my attention is most strongly fixed, 
and so on. But now for any non-question begging way in which an item 
can be the most salient feature of my experience, I can easily imagine 
cases where I demonstratively refer to some object a despite the fact 
that the appearance of some distinct object b is the most salient for me 
in the relevant way on that occasion. Appeals to salience here are of no 
help. 
In saying either that the arrow is pointing to part of the picture or 
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that it is pointing (from the picture) to the object itself, it seems that 
Kaplan is saying nothing more than that an act of demonstrative 
reference will involve either the intention to refer to whatever object is 
such that this part of my perceptual field (so to speak) is an appearance 
of it, or the intention to refer to this which is appearing A'ly to me. But 
if this is right, then in either case, Kaplan's "arrow" represents nothing 
more than a mental demonstration: in the first case, the demonstration 
of some dubious sense-datum-like appearance, in the second case, the 
demonstration of the object itself. In either case, the question is clearly 
being begged. 
It begins to emerge that it is a mistake to try to understand 
demonstrative reference in terms of any even quasi-descriptive model, 
even if the relevant description is not assumed exhaustively to deter- 
mine the cognitive significance of the relevant demonstrations. 
The distinctiveness (both cognitively and semantically) of demonstra- 
tive reference from descriptive reference can be made even more 
evident. Consider again our original problem: the potential informative- 
ness of demonstrative identity statements. Imagine a situation adapted 
from John Perry, TM in which I and someone else are facing the U.S.S. 
Enterprise with its middle section obscured by a large building. Now 
suppose that, intending to say something informative, I utter an instance 
of 
(4) That [demonstratively referring to the ship as it appears to 
the left of the obscuring building] is identical with that 
[demonstratively referring to the ship as it appears to the 
right of the building]. 
How, on Kaplan's view, are we to explain how my statement is 
informative to some auditor/observer? It seems that if my statement is 
to be informative to someone else, then in some sense, I must be able, 
on Kaplan's view, to express the sense of my demonstration; or, rather, 
competently performing the demonstration would just have to count as 
expressing its sense. If my audience is to understand me, then, he must 
be able to grasp the senses of my two demonstrations, the senses I 
intended to express; for, presumably, it will be on the basis of his 
having grasped these senses, together with his awareness (or belief) that 
the conditions determined by them could be satisfied by two distinct 
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things, that make it possible for him to find it informative that they in 
fact are satisfied by the same thing. 
But now what exactly is supposed to be involved in his grasping the 
sense of my demonstration? Well, in the first place, he will have 
grasped my demonstration only if he will thereby have been made 
aware of the object to which I was intending to refer. But how is this 
accomplished? With descriptions there would seem to be no particular 
difficulty. I express my intention to be referring to whatever object 
satisfies the conditions associated with a certain description by verbally 
uttering a token of that description. My auditor will grasp my intention 
if he grasps my words, recognizing that I intend to be using them 
literally. And he will grasp my words if, in virtue of his competence 
with those words, he recognizes the conditions associated with the 
relevant description. Thus he will grasp my intention to be referring to 
whatever satisfies these conditions. 
Now, in the case of demonstrations, I express my intention to be 
referring to some object by performing an appropriate demonstration. 
My auditor will grasp my intention if, in some sense, he grasps the 
demonstration that I performed. But is it plausible to suppose, as it was 
in the description case, that his grasping my demonstration consisted in 
his recognizing, in virtue of his competence with demonstratives, some 
set of conditions I associate (semantically) with the demonstration, and 
thereby grasps my (purported) intention to be referring to whatever, 
from my perspective, satisfies them? But this is not what happens. 
Whatever resources I bring to bear in order to determine what object a 
speaker, on the occasion of his performing a particular act of demon- 
strative reference, intends to be referring to -- including (essentially) 
my knowledge of the conventions governing demonstrative gestures and 
my beliefs about the speaker's beliefs and interests on the given 
occasion -- ! certainly do not attempt to grasp an expressed (Dk)-type 
sense, and then proceed to identify the object that satisfies it. 
Even if (contrary to what I have just been arguing) the performance 
of a demonstration did, in some sense, involve the deployment of a 
(Dk)-type sense in the way Kaplan proposes, it is not at all clear that it 
would make sense to suppose that I (as audience) could grasp that 
sense -- not, at least, in the way that I am supposed to grasp the 
meaning of his other words. Suppose, for example that under the 
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circumstances in which I uttered (4), the person I was addressing was 
situated some distance from me. Suppose that from his perspective, 
both perceptual and epistemic, the object to which I have demon- 
stratively referred appears differently to him than it does to me. 
Overall, the cognitive significance for him of my demonstration may be 
quite different from what it is for me. But then how, given Kaplan's 
picture of things, did he grasp my demonstration, the demonstration I 
deployed in order to fix my reference and convey my information. 
Indeed, how did he manage to understand what I said? If Kaplan's 
account is correct, it is hard to see how he possibly could have. But the 
point, of course, is that he did. He understood what I said, including my 
demonstrations perfectly well. The trouble lies in supposing that what is 
involved in my competently demonstrating the object and his grasping 
that demonstration can be accounted for in terms of a theory of the sort 
Kaplan suggests. 
Kaplan is, needless to say, not unaware of this problem, though I 
believe that he fails fully to appreciate the difficulties that it raises for 
his proposal. In response, Kaplan suggests that, perhaps, rather than 
admit that the same demonstration might have different senses -- which 
would be disastrous for his proposal -- we should say that a single 
performance may involve distinct demonstrations with distinct senses 
from the perspective of distinct audiences [p. 53]. It is difficult to know 
what precisely Kaplan has in mind here. If all this comes to is the claim 
that the cognitive significance of a given demonstration in use may be 
different for a speaker and his audience, conditioned in each case by 
their different epistemic perspectives, then plainly this provides no 
support for his view, but rather is a redescription of the problem his 
view must face. Whatever exactly Kaplan does have in mind, though, if 
his suggestion is to save him from the difficulties raised above, then it 
must be capable of sustaining the intuition that my demonstrative 
statement was fully understood. But how exactly is this supposed to 
work? 
Presumably, a single demonstrative performance may involve distinct 
senses in the same way that a single utterance of a definite description 
might be ambiguous. But now suppose that I utter a sentence with what 
is in fact an ambiguous definite description in it, say, 
(5) Dthat(the F) is G. 
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Let 'the 4' and 'the ~p' be the two possible disambiguous readings of 
'the F'. Furthermore,  assume that 'the 4' and 'the ~0' are satisfied by the 
same object. Now suppose that when I uttered (5), I intended to be 
saying that 
(6) Dthat(the 4) is G. 
If my auditor takes me to have said (6), then plainly he will have 
understood my statement. However,  if he takes me to have said that 
(7) Dthat(the ~0) is G; 
then --  even though he will have correctly identified the truth-evatuable 
propositional content of what I said, he will not strictly speaking have 
fully understood my statement. It will be a happy accident that what he 
took me to be saying had the same content as what I in fact intended to 
say. Indeed, It is conceivable that his failure to understand what I said 
may go unnoticed, but it nevertheless would count as a failure to 
understand what I had intended to convey. 
Since successfully grasping another speaker's demonstrative inten- 
tions does not in any plausible way depend upon having to grasp some 
condition-specifying sense, a speaker's intention to refer demonstra- 
tively to some object cannot correctly be explained in terms which 
require his having some condition-specifying sense in mind such that 
his referential intentions lust is the intention to refer (attributively) to 
whatever satisfies those conditions in the relevant context. To suppose 
so would be to miss precisely what is distinctive about demonstrative 
reference. 
2. This last point can be made in a way that drives home the essential 
irrelevance of condition-specifying senses for demonstrative reference. 
Suppose that I utter some demonstrative sentence, 'That is F'. Ask 
yourself, what is it that I as a competent user of the language literally 
meant to say. What thought did I mean to convey? For  any non- 
question begging, condition-specifying sense C, suppose my auditor 
took me to have said 'Dthat(C) is F'. Will he have understood me? No 
matter what C is, the answer will be no. Even if, in fact, C characterizes 
as closely as possible the cognitive significance for me of my demon- 
stration, the answer will still be no. In the first place, it should be 
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evident that, for any C, I could believe that Dthat(C) is F without 
believing of the relevant object that that object is F, for it is always 
possible that I should fail to believe that that object is C (see below). 
And so it should also be evident that, for any C,  my auditor could grasp 
the thought expressed by 'Dthat(C) is F '  without his grasping (vis-~-vis 
the object I demonstrated) that 'that object is F", where 'that' occurs 
demonstratively. But plainly it is the content of the latter claim that he 
would have to grasp if he were to understand what I said. Of course, it 
doesn't matter in the least if in addition to believing "That is F '  he also 
believes 'That is C'. But if he does, then while C will be relevant to the 
cognitive significance of my claim for him, it will be no part of what I 
literally said. 
To see this more clearly, let x be the object about which a speaker S 
makes the demonstrative claim: "That is F." In making this claim, S will 
have intended ofx  that it be the subject of his claim. Now inevitably, S 
will have a number of beliefs about x, about that object there. He  
might, for example, believe of x that it is C or even that it is the C. It 
might even be the case that S intended to refer to x and say of it that it 
is F because he took x, the intended object of his demonstrative 
reference, to be C (or the C). Indeed, we might suppose that had S 
thought at all that that object there, x, was not C (or the C), he would 
never have intended to refer to it - -  he would never have intended to 
claim of it that it was F. In a certain sense, then, we might very well be 
willing to say of S that he intended to refer to a C (or the C). But is this 
"referential intention" at all relevant to the success or failure of his 
intention to refer demonstratively to x, to that object there? Insofar as 
he intended to refer demonstratively to x, the answer is plainly no. It is 
only confusion to think otherwise. For  suppose that in fact x is not C 
(or the C). Now although it is true that in such a case we might be 
willing to say that in some sense S failed to refer to what he intended to 
refer to, this is true only with respect to an intention the failure of 
which does not defeat - -  indeed, is only explicable in terms of - -  S's 
successful demonstrative reference to x. With respect to the relevant 
referential intention, the intention to say of that object there that it is F, 
S will not have failed to refer to what he intended to refer to. This 
latter sort of referential intention must not only be recognized, but it 
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must be recognized to be the only sort of referential intention relevant 
to fixing the semantic reference of competently used deomonstratives. 
These last considerations show that for any proposed descriptive 
condition C (whether conceptual or perceptual, or infected with other 
indexicals), a speaker's intention to refer to what satisfies C will not 
count as successfully demonstrative unless there is some object such 
that he takes that object to be C and intends to refer to that object. But 
in this case -- since he could after all be mistaken about that object's 
being C -- satisfaction of C plays no direct role in the determination of 
his intended demonstrative reference, though it will doubtless contri- 
bute to its cognitive significance. The point is that the demonstrative 
here is ineliminable. The demonstrative way of referring to (and 
thinking about) objects, then, is evidently more distinctive, more primi- 
tive than Kaplan's views allow, and is not, as he supposes, reducible to 
or explicable by analogy with the descriptive way of referring to objects 
- -  even when the 'description' is supplemented, as in (Dk) with context- 
fixing pure indexicals. 
It follows from all of this that no sense of the sort that Kaplan wants 
to associate with demonstrations will be part of what gets expressed on 
the occasion of the utterance of a demonstrative claim. No such sense 
will satisfactorily account for the cognitive significance of a demonstra- 
tive claim. And no such sense will play the essential role Kaplan assigns 
it in determining the demonstratum of a given demonstration. 
By now, it should be evident that the cognitive significance that a 
given demonstrative claim has for someone is not something that is 
directly determined by the semantic rules that govern the competent 
use and interpretation of demonstratives. It is no part of the "meaning" 
of demonstratives that on a given occasion of use they possess the 
particular cognitive significance that they in fact do -- either for the 
speaker or the auditor. Rather, the particular cognitive significance that 
a demonstrative has on a given occasion of use will largely be a 
function of the speaker's or his auditor's distinctive extra-linguistic 
epistemic perspective -- and not, directly at least, a function of any 
semantic rules. Rather, the semantic rules governing demonstratives 
(knowledge of which is required for competence with demonstratives) 
limit in distinctive ways the manner in which the cognitive significance 
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of a given demonstrative in use will be sensative to the speaker's 
collateral beliefs. Nor does the cognitive significance of a given demon- 
strative in use play any direct and determinate role in fixing or 
determining the referent of that demonstrative. And though the correct 
interpretation of demonstrative claims may require the interpreter to 
share many and guess at other collateral beliefs of the speaker, the 
cognitive significance for the speaker of a given demonstrative is no 
part of what gets fiterally said, nor is it any part of what is taken to have 
been said insofar as the demonstrative claim is understood. Conse- 
quently, unlike what Kaplan supposes to be the case with definite 
description identity statements, demonstrative identity statements will 
not be informative to one in virtue of their expressed character (sense). 
Instead, they will be informative in virtue of the particular effect that 
grasping their content has on one's epistemic situation, given the 
differences in cognitive significance which one attaches to each demon- 
strative in use. 
Kaplan is evidently attracted to his 'Corrected Fregean Theory of 
Demonstratives' for a number of reasons, but of central importance to 
him is the fact that "by incorporating demonstration types in its 
sentence types, such a theory accounts for more differences in informa- 
tiveness as differences in meaning (character)" [emphasis added] [p. 58]. 
If I am right, however, this is precisely what we ought not to want to try 
to do, for this is explictly to buy into Frege's view that differences in 
cognitive significance must directly reflect objective semantic differ- 
ences, a view that I have tried to show to be mistaken. I have, in 
particular, tried to expose the sort of distortion that adoption of this 
view engenders in the case of demonstratives -- how it leads to a failure 
to appreciate fully either the distinctive cognitive or the distinctive 
semantic features of these indexicals. But I hope that it is clear that 
the problems with this view are general and not merely limited to 
indexicals. 
Finally, a caveat. I am not claiming that the semantic properties of 
sentences have no bearing on their cognitive significance -- no more 
than I would claim that the semantic properties of sentences (the very 
sentences we use in the content clauses of propositional attitude 
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ascriptions) have no bearing on the beliefs or other attitudes a person 
may have and express using those sentences. If there were not deep and 
important connections between semantics and cognitive significance, 
the very possibility of interpreting others' speech, appreciating their 
propositional attitudes, and understanding and explaining their behav- 
ior in terms of these attitudes would seem an illusion or at best a total 
mystery. If, however, we are ever even to begin adequately to under- 
stand these complicated connections, we must first free ourselves from 
the overly simplistic view of them that we have inherited from Frege. 19 
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relevant to determining (perhaps, in some sense, contributing to) the sense --  and 
thereby the reference --  of that expression on an occasion of use. See 'Thoughts', ibid., 
p. 358. The non-identity of sense and linguistic meaning is cogently argued for by Tyler 
Burge in 'Sinning against Frege', The Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 398--432. 
Burge, however, seems to downplay the relevance of the possible systematic connec- 
tions between the sense that an expression has on an occasion of use and the context 
invariant linguistic meaning of the expression used. 
4 For an especially clear diagnosis of some of the problems in this regard see John 
Perry, 'Frege on demonstratives', The Philosophical Review 85 (1977) pp. 474--497, 
and 'The Essential Indexical', Nofis 13 (1979) pp. 3--21. For a critique of Perry on 
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Frege on demonstratives, see Gareth Evans, 'Understanding Demonstratives', in H. 
Parret and J. Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding, De Gruyter, New York, 
1981, pp. 280--303. 
5 See especially his unpublished but widely circulated monograph, Demonstratives, 
UCLA, March 1977. The central distinctions and technical apparatus also appear in his 
'On the logic of demonstratives', Journal of PhilosophicaI Logic $ (1978), pp. 81--98. 
6 Demonstratives, p. 8 Henceforth, page references to this work will appear in the text 
between square brackets. 
7 I should not be taken in what follows to be endorsing Kaplan's interpretation of 
Frege's views. In some important respects I think it is mistaken, but Frege exegesis is 
not my principal concern. Nevertheless, Kaplan's views do, I believe, represent the 
dominant interpretation. And in any case, so far as I can tell, nothing essential to my 
argument against the Fregean direct connection thesis, using Kaplan's proposals about 
indexicals as a foil, hangs on Kaplan's exegetical discrepencies. 
8 Though Kaplan does not mention it, this qualification is essential, for otherwise, 
descriptions in terms of.different uniquely identifying essential properties will count as 
identical in sense. Hence, identity statements in which they are used (e.g., 'The positive 
square root of four is identical to the only positive even prime', etc.) will count as 
uninformative --  a result that Frege would plainly have rejected. 
9 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, see 
esp. pp. 15, 53--60. 
~0 Also see Kaplan's paper, 'Dthat', reprinted in Peter French et aL, eds., Comtempo- 
rary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1977, pp. 383--400. 
11 The "formal logic L.D." referred to here is just the model theoretic semantic 
treatment of languages with indexicals and 'dthat'-descriptions published in 'On the 
Logic of Demonstratives', op. cit. 
lz As my brief discussion of predicates on page 176 will suggest, I believe that even 
here the fit is not nearly as snug as is generally supposed. 
13 In fact, Kaplan's way of understanding what is distinctive about these "pure" index- 
icals is not without problems. Typical uses of 'here' and 'now' are not as "pure" as 
Kaplan supposes. A given (non-demonstrative) use of 'here', for example, may have a 
variety of different referents depending upon the speaker's intentions on the occasion of 
use. He may be referring to the spot on which he is standing, the room he is in, the city 
he is in, the country, the neighborhood, or what have you. Likewise, 'now' might be 
used to refer to the present moment, the present hour, day, week, etc., depending upon 
the speaker's intentions. What intentions the speaker has will obviously impact on the 
cognitive significance of a given use of one of these indexicals. Even so, none of my 
criticisms in the text essentally depend upon an exploitation of this particular deficiency 
in Kaplan's account. I am especially indebted to David Sachs for discussions on this and 
other issues in this paper. 
14 But see Note 11, above. 
~5 A similar story could be told, but where the object is in fact replaced by a qualita- 
tively identical replica. The "appearance", i.e., the demonstration type, would still be the 
same. But now, obviously, demonstration types, as characterized by Kaplan, won't be 
anything like Fregean senses, since, for Frege, sameness of sense guarentees sameness 
of referent. 
16 This is not, of course, to deny that an appeal to something like a. mode of presenta- 
tion is never required in order to appreciate the particular cognitive significance that a 
given demonstration has for someone, or particular differences in cognitive significance 
that two demonstrations to the same object might have. 
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17 Compare, for example, David Lewis's appeal to salience in 'Scorekeeping in the 
language game", in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1983, esp. pp. 240--243. 
18 Perry, 'Frege on Demonstratives', op. cit.,p. 483. 
19 In addition to David Sachs, I would also like to thank George Wilson for his advice 
and encouragement. 
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